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COMMENTS
DOUBLE-BREASTED OPERATIONS IN THE
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY: A SEARCH FOR
CONCRETE GUIDELINES
I. INTRODUCTION: AN OVERVIEW

The concept of double-breasting in the construction industry did
not emerge until the mid-1960's and early 1970's.' Not until the late
1970's did the technique begin to pervade the industry. Whatever the
cause behind this trend, 2 double-breasting has now become a common
practice, and a problem of great concern for companies and unions
alike. Few issues in the field of labor law are at once so frequently raised
yet so difficultly resolved.
Traditionally, double-breasting occurs when a contractor, who is
bound by one or more collective bargaining agreements, establishes
another company, in the same area, which is not similarly bound., The
contractor's primary motivation for establishing this second company
is generally to enable him to successfully bid on jobs which do not require union contractors. Because of higher labor costs, the unionized
company will almost always be underbid for these jobs.
1. See L & S Construction Co., 155 N.L.R.B. 524 (1965) and Central N.M.
Chapter Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 152 N.L.R.B. 1604 (1965) for two of the early
Board decisions on the problem. Because of several significant latter decisions,
however, L & S has fallen into obscurity, and the commonly acknowledged starting
point for any analysis on the topic is the early 1970's. See Bornstein, The Emerging
Law of "Double-Breasted" Operation in the Construction Industry, 28 LAB. L.J.
77,78 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Bornstein]. Central New Mexico has retained some
vitality, although it also has been foreshadowed by later decisions. See notes 187 and
194 and accompanying text infra.
2. One commentator places primary responsibility for the development of this
technique on the changing economic climate in the construction industry. See Penfield,
The Double-Breasted Operation in the Construction Industry, 27 LAB. L.J. 89 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Penfield]. While the economy cannot be discounted as a factor,
the actual catalyst for the movement was probably the pro-employer stance which the
Board took in its early decisions. See notes 28-60 and accompanying text infra.
3. See Comment, Dual Companies- When Does a Union Have the Right to Expanded Representation?, 12 U.S.F.L. REv. 89 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Comment,
Dual Companies]. A similar result may be achieved in a variety of other manners. A
nonunion company may seek to form a union company, or, a union enterprise may
wish to form another union company, which may enter into an agreement with a different union. The Labor Board, however, has suggested that this latter variation is not
properly labeled double-breasting, which embraces only "two companies operating in
different economic climates, one union and one nonunion." Appalachian Constr.,
Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. 685, 686 (1978).
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If he is successful in his double-breasting attempt, the contractor
will enjoy the best of both worlds. His union company can continue to
bid on jobs requiring union contractors. Meanwhile, his nonunion
operation can competitively bid on other jobs."
As expected, unions do not passively accept double-breasting. They
feel that the employer is attempting to circumvent their rights under
the collective bargaining agreement. Any of several methods may be
used against the employer in this situation. First, the union may
threaten the employer with strikes or other economic weapons unless
the employer agrees to bargain in relation to the nonunion contractor.
While this alternative may be an effective one, especially where the
employer would suffer great economic loss if a strike were to occur, it
is also a perilous route for the union to follow. Ultimately, the union
may be charged with a section 8(b)(4) unfair labor practice.5
Another alternative for the union is to seek arbitration to determine whether the employer is violating the collective bargaining agreement by employing nonunion members, contrary to the union security
clause. If the arbitration clause is sufficiently broad, the union may be
successful in compelling arbitration."
The third alternative which the union may pursue is the filing of an
unfair labor practice charge against the companies, commonly claiming refusal to bargain under section 8(a)(5) of the Labor Management
Relations Act.' While there is nothing inherently illegal in such double4. See Bornstein, supra note 1; Penfield, supra note 2.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976). See Carpenters Local Union No. 213, 201
N.L.R.B. 23 (1973).
6. Approximately eighty-three percent of all collective bargaining agreements
contain some form of a security clause, which, in its most common form, requires all
bargaining unit employees to join the union. See COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRAcTs 87:1 (Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. 1970).
7. See Local No. 6, Bricklayers, Masons and Plasterers v. Boyd G. Heminger,
Inc., 483 F.2d 129 (6th Cir. 1973). In Heminger, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit upheld the union's right to compel arbitration on such an issue, in
spite of the argument that to hold that the new entity is bound by the arbitration clause
of the agreement, to which it is not signatory, requires at least an implicit finding that
the new company is merely an extension of the first company. Id. at 132-36
(O'Sullivan, J., dissenting). For further insight into the arbitration problem, see Saad,

"'Double-Breasting:
" Operating a Union and Non-Union Shop, in
23, 41 (1972).

CONSTRUCTION IN-

DUSTRY: LABOR PROBLEMS

8. Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1976), provides that
"[iut shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer... (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section
159(a) of this title." Generally, a § 8(a)(5) claim is joined by a claim under § 8(a)(1),
which prohibits the employer from interfering with the right of employees to organize
and bargain collectively. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976). Also see Id. § 157.
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breasted operations,' in some situtations the union may obtain relief.
First, the union may prevail by demonstrating that the second company is an alter ego of the first.' An alter ego finding will automatically bind the nonunion company to the collective bargaining agreement." Absent some blatant conduct by the employer indicating an intention to circumvent its union obligation,' 2 however, the union will be
left to rely upon the single employer doctrine.'I
If it successfully asserts the single employer argument, the union
must then establish that the employees of both entities have common
interests sufficient to warrant inclusion in the same bargaining unit."
While the National Labor Relations Board has established relatively
standardized tests for making the necessary inquiries,'I tests which
It is not uncommon in the construction industry for the same interests to
have two separate organizations, one to handle contracts performed under
union conditions and the other under nonunion conditions. The Board has
recognized this fact by refusing to include the employees of a nonunion
company in the same bargaining unit with those of a union company controlled by the same interests, and by refusing to require the nonunion company to recognize the bargaining representative of the union company's
employees or to apply the collective-bargaining contract with the latter to
its own employees.
Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., 206 N.L.R.B. 562 (1973), rev'd sub noma. Local No. 627, Int'l
Union of Operating Engineers v. N.L.R.B., 518 F.2d 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1975), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, sub nom. South Prairie Const. Co. v. Local No. 627, Int'l Union
of Operating Engineers, 425 U.S. 800 (1976). See note 61 infra.
10. The alter ego theory has its roots in successorship law, whereby a new corporation assumes all or part of the business of the old corporation. See, e.g., Dee Cee
Floor Covering, Inc., 232 N.L.R.B. 421 (1977). The alter ego doctrine has been applied, and misapplied, beyond this concept. Because of this expansion there is a
tendency to confuse the alter ego and single employer doctrine. This confusion is aptly
illustrated through a comparison of the Board's and the administrative law judge's
decisions in Frank Naccarato, 233 N.L.R.B. 1394 (1977). The same basic test is applied
to both theories. Id. See United Tele. Workers v. N.L.R.B., 571 F.2d 665, 668 (D.C.
Cir. 1978). ("Remand for consideration of the 'alter-ego' doctrine would be redundant, for in ascertaining under the 'single-employer' test whether [a single employer existed], the Board plainly made factual findings akin to any it would make under an
'alter-ego' rubric"). With isolated exceptions, however, the alter ego theory has not
been applied absent substantial transfer of assets, employees, or business to the nonunion entity. See generally Comment, Dual Companies, supra note 3, at 94-95. While
the alter ego concept is closely related to the single employer doctrine, and may in
some instances have application to a double-breasted operation, detailed analysis of
the alter ego concept has not been included in this comment to avoid digression into
the complex area of successorship.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See notes 95-184 and accompanying text infra.
14. See notes 185-207 and accompanying text infra.
15. See notes 24 and 191 and accompanying text infra.
9.
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have been consistently adhered to by the courts, ' the conflict concerns
not which standards to use, but their application. The administrative
law judge, the Board, and the court of appeals may look at the same
set of facts, apply the same test, and reach totally diverse
conclusions.' 7 Moreover, the NLRB has been consistently vague in the
application of its own standards.'" The Board has summarily affirmed
administrative law judge decisions which are based on analyses that are
questionable at best. 9 The statutory scheme whereby the Board's decisions are reviewable by all eleven federal appellate courts2" must be
cited as another cause of the lack of a cohesive body of law in the area.
Thus, in an area where concrete standards, applied with uniformity,
are crucial to unions and employers alike, the law remains largely
unascertainable. 2 '
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW ON
DOUBLE-BREASTING: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

A. The Single Employer Doctrine
The first comprehensive statement on the test for a single employer
was made by the Board in its Twenty-First Annual Report. 2 This
statement was made, not in the context of double-breasting, but rather
in the context of when a single employer may be found in order for the
Board to assert jurisdiction. 3 The Board stated:
16. South Prairie Constr. Co. v. Local No. 627, Int'l Union of Operating
Engineers, 425 U.S. 800 (1976).
17. For the most noteworthy example of this uncertainty, see cases cited in note
61 infra. See generally Bornstein, supra note 1.
18. See notes 51-55 and accompanying text infra.
19. See, e.g., Frank Naccarato, 233 N.L.R.B. 1394 (1977); Don Burgess Const.
Corp., 227 N.L.R.B. 765 (1977), enforced, 596 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1979).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1976). Additionally, in some circumstances district courts
may have jurisdiction to review the Board's decision. Id.
21. One administrative law judge, when faced with a single employer question,
cautiously observed:
Given the generality of foregoing guidelines-that there are four controlling
criteria, none of which is conclusive, and not all of which need be present-it
must be said that the determinations in this area have been, in the past, somewhat
impressionistic. This, I hasten to add, is not to fault the Board, for the subject is a
complicated one, but it is difficult to find in the decisions a unifying policy objective which would illuminate the manner in which the criteria should be weighed,
or indicating whether, as might be argued, the factors should be weighed differently depending on the purpose for which the determination of "single
employer" is being made.
Erlich's 814, Inc., 231 N.L.R.B. 1237, 1242 (1977) (administrative law judge's decision).
22. 21 NLRB ANN. REP. 14-15 (1956).
23. Id. For an overview of the Board's jurisdictional requirements see LABOR
RELATIONS EXPEDITOR 374-376a (Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol6/iss1/5
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The question in such cases is whether the enterprises are sufficiently integrated to consider the business of both together in applying the
jurisdictional standards.
The principal factors which the Board weighs in deciding whether
sufficient integration exists include the extent of:
1. Interrelation of operations;
2. Centralized control of labor relations;
3. Common management, and
4. Common ownership or financial control.
No one of these factors has been held to be controlling, but the Board
opinions have stressed the first three factors, which go to show "operational integration," particularly centralized control of labor relations.
The Board has declined in several cases to find integration merely upon

the basis of common ownership or financial control. 2 '

In subsequent decisions, the Board adhered religiously to its fourcriteria test." If any doubt existed as to the validity of the test, it was
laid to rest by the Supreme Court in 1965 in Radio & Television Broad-

cast Technicians Union Local 1264 v. Broadcast Services of Mobile,
Inc.," where the Court, albeit in dicta, approvingly reiterrated the
Board's test." The four-criteria test is now solidly entrenched with the
Board and the courts alike.
The first significant development of the single employer doctrine in
the context of double-breasted operations occurred in 1971 when the
Board decided Gerace Construction, Inc. " Gerace arose in a typical
context. Francis Gerace, primary stockholder of Gerace Construction,
a union contractor, saw the need to form a nonunion company in
order to compete for certain jobs. 9 The actual impetus behind the formation of the nonunion company was the availability of a large job
which required a guarantee of completion without interruption.3"
Gerace Construction could not bid on the job because of a possible impending strike. 3
Francis Gerace and other stockholders and management personnel
24. Id.(citations omitted).
25. See, e.g., Overton Mkts., Inc., 142 N.L.R.B. 615 (1963); Sakrete of N. Cal.,
Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1220 (1962), aff'd, 332 F.2d 902 (9th Cir. 1964).
26. 380 U.S. 255 (1965). The Radio Union case also involved a jurisdictional
issue.
27. Id.at 256.
28. 193 N.L.R.B. 645 (1971).
29. Id. at 647 (trial examiner's decision). The findings of the examiner were
adopted by the Board to the extent that they were consistent with its opinion. Id. at
645. The Board, while rejecting the trial examiner's ultimate finding of a single
employer, apparently did not take issue with any of his factual findings.
30. Id.at 647 (trial examiner's decision).
31. Id.
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of Gerace Construction thus sought to incorporate a nonunion concern, Helger Construction, 3" for the purpose of bidding on this job.
Helger bid on, and was awarded the job. 3
After Helger's formation in May, 1970, its business affairs were initially managed by Gerace personnel. Helger's books were kept by
Helen Gerace at no charge. Sweebe, Helger's chief managing officer,
remained a full-time employee on Gerace's payroll for approximately
five months after assuming that position. During that time he managed
Helger's business from his home, although at times he was contacted
at Gerace concerning Helger. Initially, Francis Gerace owned twothirds of Helger's stock. He and a Gerace official constituted twothirds of Helger's board of directors.3 '
This was the status of the companies in August, 1970, when the
union first approached Francis Gerace concerning Helger.15
In September, 1970, Sweebe was transferred to Helger's payroll. A
trailer was set up for Helger's temporary office. The trailer and the
land on which it was placed were both owned by Francis Gerace. 3 '
Construction of permanent offices on the same land was begun "for
Francis Gerace by Helger."" During that same month, the union filed
a complaint with the NLRB.
Two months later, Francis Gerace resigned from Helger's board of
directors and transferred his shares in Helger to Sweebe.1 The trial examiner found Helger and Gerace to be a single employer.3 9 While the
examiner mentioned many factors, great significance was given to the
fact that Helger had steadfastly operated consistently within the confines of the labor relations policies Francis Gerace had envisioned.' 0
Taking a pragmatic approach, the examiner suggested that it was unlikely that Helger could deviate from these practices without first obtaining Francis Gerace's approval."
While the trial examiner did not explicitly utilize the Radio Union
four-criteria test, his standard was substantially similar. He clearly
found that at least three of the four Radio Union criteria, common
32.
33.
was not
34.

Id.
Helger was not actually in legal existence at this point in time. Id. at 648. It
officially incorporated until the day it began work on the project.
Id. at 647-50.

35. Id. at 649.
36. Id. at 647-50.
37. Id. at 648. This site was approximately one half mile from the Gerace Construction offices.

38. Id. at 645.
39. Id.at 650.
40. Id.
41.

Id.
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ownership, centralized control of labor relations, and common management, were present. 2
The Board rejected the conclusions of the trial examiner, determining that the facts did not warrant a finding of a single employer.' 3 Initially, the Board conceded that Helger and Gerace had common stockholders and common directors holding a legal right of control over the
enterprises." The Board noted, however, that common ownership
alone is never sufficient to find a single employer.' 5 Furthermore, the
questions of common control of management and labor relations turn
on actual or active, rather than merely potential control." While the
of control, the Board found that
owners of Gerace had a legal right
7
they had not asserted that right.'
The Board then enumerated several facts supporting their conclusion that no single employer existed:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)

each company was a separate legal entity;
each had their own bank accounts and payroll accounts;
each kept separate corporate records;
each filed separate tax returns;
each submitted separate job bids;
the entities generally did not bid on the same job;
Helger operated on its own capital;
neither Francis Gerace nor Gerace Construction gave performance
guarantees for Helger;
there was no evidence that Gerace Construction lost business to
Helger or that Gerace employees lost work because of Helger;
Helger generally bid on smaller jobs, while Gerace bid on larger
ones;
Helger was an open shop without regard to craft lines;
Helger paid it employees less than Gerace's contract rate;
the entities maintained separate health and workman's compensation insurance;
Gerace employed a relative large compliment, 95, compared to
Helger's 16 workers;

42. The trial examiner mentioned six factors which he viewed as significant in
deciding the single employer issue. Id. at 649-50. The four Radio Union criteria were
mentioned in this enumeration. The other two factors mentioned by the Gerace examiner, financial dependence and interchange of employees, are also relevant in determining the single employer issue. See notes 145-47 and accompanying text infra.
43. 193 N.L.R.B. at 650. The trial examiner then proceeded to find Helger's
employees to be accretions to the Gerace bargaining unit. Id. at 650-51.
44. Id. at 645.
45. Id.

46. Id.
47.

Id.
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there was no employee interchange, even though some of Helger's
employees formerly worked for Gerace;
although Gerace owned the trailer and much of the equipment used
by Helger, Helger paid rent for them; a practice which was not uncommon in the business; and
there was no evidence that Helger was formed to effect, or actually
did effect, union activity or the union's majority status in Gerace

Construction."
The Board also discussed Francis Gerace's relationship to Helger.
It emphasized that, while Francis Gerace originally had ownership and
potential control over Helger, he had since resigned as director and
had transferred all of his stock to Sweebe, a person without authority

in Gerace. Sweebe was "progressively [assuming] more independent
responsibility,"" 9 and was in complete control of Helger's day-to-day
operations."°

The Gerace decision left many questions unanswered. The Board
neither cited Radio Union nor specifically enunciated the four-criteria
test." Common ownership was mentioned, but only to emphasize that
such ownership is not determinative." Common control of labor relations was established as "[a] critical factor."" While common
management and interrelation of operations were not given express
consideration by the Gerace Board, several factors which were mentioned would seem to have primary relevance to these criteria."' Thus,
Gerace failed to answer the fundamental question of whether the
Radio Union test would be applied in the double-breasting context."
Despite this flaw, Gerace had immeasurable practical significance for

the construction industry. The decision's pro-employer attitude
established double-breasting as a viable practice, and literally spawned
56
a new area of labor law.

48. Id. at 645-47.
49. Id. at 646.
50. Id. at 645.
51. See generally Bornstein, supra note 1, at 79.
52. 193 N.L.R.B. at 645. Other than this, the Board gave no indication concerning what, if any, significance common ownership had in determining the single
employer issue.
53. Id. The use of the article "a" supports the view that labor relations is not
"the" sole critical factor. But see note 108 and accompanying text infra.
54. See notes 139-48 and 165 and accompaying text infra. This reference,
however, cannot be taken as proof that the Board did indeed implicitly consider these
criteria. These facts may also be relevant in determining control of labor relations.
55. Gerace has been interpreted as resting solely on the labor relations inquiry,
rather than the Radio Union test. See Appalachian Const. Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. 685
(1978); Bornstein, supra note 1, at 82.
56. See Penfield, supra note 2.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol6/iss1/5
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A month after the Gerace decision, the Board in FrankN. Smith
Associates, Inc.," summarily affirmed the trial examiner's conclusion
that the two operations involved in that case were not single employers. Smith was similar to Gerace" and the end results in the cases were
consistent. Unlike Gerace, however, the trial examiner's finding of
separate employers in Smith was expressly premised on the Radio
Union criteria. 9 Thus, Smith left substantial doubt concerning the correct standard for analysis.60
The next major development in the area occurred in the South
Prairie cases." While this line of cases arose in a slightly different
manner than did Gerace,'2 little if any basis exists by which these cases
can be legitimately distinguished . 3 The Board, relying heavily on
57. 194 N.L.R.B. 212 (1971).
58. Id.at 212 n.j.
59. Id. at 217-18.
60. Professor Bornstein expressed the view that the rationales of Smith and
Gerace are diametrically opposed to one another, noting that the difference "may be
not so much a paradox as it is a paradigm of decision-making by the NLRB, whose left
and right hands are not always perfectly coordinated." Bornstein, supra note 1, at 82.
61. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., 206 N.L.R.B. 562 (1973), rev'd sub nom. Local No.
627, Int'l Union of Operating Engineers v. NLRB, 518 F.2d 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, sub nom. South Prairie Constr. Co. v. Operating
Engineers, Local No. 627, Int'l Union of Operating Engineers, 425 U.S. 800 (1976), on
remand, 231 N.L.R.B. 76 (1977), aff'd sub nom. Local No. 627, Int'l Union of
Operating Engineers v. N.L.R.B., 595 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1979). These cases will be
collectively referred to as "the South Prairie cases" in this comment. The initial three
cases will be referred to as "South Prairie I," while the decisions on remand will be
referred to as "South Prairie I." It should be noted that this is not the designation
which the Board or the courts give to the decisions when referring to them individually.
In spite of this problem, "South Prairie" is used here to provide as much cohesiveness
and clarity as possible.
62. In Gerace, the nonunion company was formed for the purpose of creating a
double-breasted operation. In South Prairie, the nonunion company was already in
operation in another state and was brought into the same jurisdiction as the union entity.
63. See generally Bornstein, supra, note 1. While the South Prairie trial examiner
attempted to distinguish Gerace on the grounds that in Gerace the nonunion company
was formed prior to the signing of the collective bargaining agreement, the Board
found this distinction to be of no significance. 206 N.L.R.B. at 563 n.4. The examiner
in South Prairie also distinguished Gerace on the basis that Gerace Construction lost
no business because of its nonunion counterpart, the two entities being noncompetitive. 206 N.L.R.B. at 572 n.49. While the Board in Gerace did view this as relevant, it is a tenuous ground on which to justify two divergent results. For a sharp
criticism of the trial examiner's decision, see Bornstein, supra note 1, at 84-85. The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in South Prairie I
also attempted to distinguish Gerace on the basis that in that decision the Board found
an absence of actual control. 518 F.2d at 1049. While the Board's South Prairie I decision is vague, however, it did cite the "actual control" language of Gerace in rendering
its decision, and then went on to find separate employers. 206 N.L.R.B. at 562-63.
Moreover, the Board's rejection of the trial examiner's attempt to distinguish Gerace
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Gerace, and focusing primarily on labor relations policies, reversed the
administrative law judge and found that the two entities were
separate. "I
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in what
may be termed a controversial decision, reversed the Board, and found
the two entities to be a single employer. 5 While it is impossible to
isolate the central thrust of the circuit court's decision, there was obvious discontent with the Board's increasing emphasis on control of

labor relations .66
The court, maintaining that the Radio Union four-criteria test was
applicable, observed that no single criterion was dispositive.6 7 After
establishing the four-criteria test as controlling, however, the court
made several statements which, although undoubtedly intended to give
some substance to the skeletal test, were perhaps more deceptive than
helpful. First, the court stated that determination of a single employer
depended on the overall circumstances. 6 8 Second, the court said that
the standard for evaluation was whether there was an arms length relationship between the two entities. 6 These statements left at least some
doubt as to whether the court was in reality adhering to the Radio
70
Union test or attempting to create a new one.
After establishing that the two entities constituted a single
employer, 7 ' the court proceeded to find that employees of both enter72
prises constituted an appropriate unit for bargaining.
The Supreme Court, showing deference to the court of appeals, affirmed its single employer finding. 73 The Court, however, failed to expressly decide whether the Radio Union test was equally applicable in
was premised on the fact that absence of "actual control" was critical in that case. 206
N.L.R.B. at 63 n.4. Thus, a more reasonable analysis would be to read the Board's

South Prairie I decision as finding a lack of actual control.
64. 206 N.L.R.B. at 563.
65. 518 F.2d at 1047.
66. Id. at 1046.
67.

Id. at 1045-46. In support of its position, the court noted that in one early

case a single employer was found absent common control of labor relations. Id. at
1045 (citing Canton Carp's, Inc., 125 N.L.R.B. 483 (1959)).
68. 518 F.2d at 1045. See notes 182 and 183 and accompanying text infra.
69. Id. at 1046. See note 184 and accompanying text infra.
70. See Bornstein, supra note 1.

71.

Id. at 1046-47. The court found that all of the requisite four criteria were

established. Contrary to the Board, the court placed a great deal of emphasis on upper
management. Also, the court emphasized that the establishment of the nonunion entity

in the area was "the touchstone for day-to-day decisions." Id. at 1046.
72. Id. at 1048-50.
73.

425 U.S. 800. The Court went so far as to imply that it might have supported

the Board's decision had it been the initial reviewing court. Id. at 804 n.5.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol6/iss1/5
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the context of double-breasting." The Court did find, however, that
the circuit court had overstepped its bounds by deciding the unit issue.
Because the Board's finding of separate employers obviated any need
for a decision on the unit question, the appellate court should have
remanded the issue for initial consideration by the Board."
When these first three South Prairie decisions are analyzed
together with Gerace and Smith, the inherent problems become apparent. The Board, while bound to the single employer finding in
South Prairie, was arguably free to apply whatever test it chose in
subsequent decisions. ' 6 Despite the vagueness of the Supreme Court's
South Prairiedecision, it could certainly be argued that it implicitly
established the Radio Union test as controlling. A rejection of the test
would thus be a perilous route for the Board to follow. Conversely, if
the Radio Union test was accepted, the validity of Geracewould be immediately thrown into question." Furthermore, once a test was estab-"
lished, there would be a question as to how that test would be applied.
Specifically, if the Radio Union four-criteria test was to be applied, it
would then have to be determined what factors were dispositive of
which criteria.
B. The Bargaining Unit Question
The Supreme Court's South Prairie decision set the stage for yet
another landmark decision by the National Labor Relations Board. As
noted by the Supreme Court," Board precedent generally indicates
that a single employer finding does not necessarily mandate inclusion
of both enterprises' employees in the same bargaining unit.7 9 Rather,
the unit question turns upon whether, because of the community of interests of the employees,8" they should be included in a single unit
74. While the Court quoted the Radio Union test, it did so only in summarizing
the circuit court's opinion.
75. Id. at 806.
76. Decisions of the circuit courts are generally not binding precedent on the
Board. Cf. Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service, Inc., 243 N.L.R.B. No. 140 (August 6,
1979), supplementing, 229 N.L.R.B. 629 (1977) (the NLRB rejected the rule, adopted
by five appellate courts, that impasse in bargaining enables unilateral employer
withdrawal from a multiemployer bargaining unit). While the Supreme Court's decisions are binding on the Board, it is not clear whether the Court adopted the Radio
Union test in South Prairie.
77. See notes 51-55 and accompanying text supra.

78.

425 U.S. at 805.

79. See, e.g., Central N.M. Chapter, Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 152
N.L.R.B. 1604, 1608 (1965); Dixie Belle Mills, Inc., 139 N.L.R.B. 629, 630 (1962).
80. 152 N.L.R.B. 1604, 1608.
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under section 9 of the Act. 8 Other decisions, however, may be read to
suggest that such an independent inquiry is unnecessary.8 2
The Supreme Court's South Prairie decision mandated that the
unit inquiry be made once a single employer had been found.8 3 The
Court, however, consistent with the statutory scheme,"' left the Board
to determine the degree of independent scrutiny to be given to the unit
issue. While the Board had, in several pre-Gerace decisions," refused
to find a single unit after establishing the existence of a single
employer, post-Gerace cases had as a matter of course found a single
unit to be appropriate where a single employer had been established. 86
In light of the recent pro-employer attitude displayed by the Board on
the single employer doctrine, it seemed certain that, even if the two inquiries were kept nominally distinct, almost every union which could
overcome the single employer barrier could also convince the NLRB
that a single unit was appropriate.
The NLRB's decision on remand in South Prairie7 represented the
first post-Gerace double-breasting case in which a single unit determination was refused, even though a single employer had been found.
The Board emphasized that the two inquiries had analytically distinct
foundations. "In determining whether a single employer exists we are
concerned with the common ownership, structure, and integrated control of the separate corporations; in determining the scope of the unit,
we are concerned with the community of interests of the employees involved." 8
Thus, the essence of the unit inquiry was viewed as a question of
whether the employees of both concerns possessed a community of interests.8 9 Conversely, the focus in determining the single employer
issue was on the employers rather than on the employees.9" After
81. "The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to employees
the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this subchapter, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft
unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976).
82. See Royal Oak Tool & Mach. Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 1361 (1961).
83. 425 U.S. at 805.
84. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976).
85. See B & B Indus., 162 N.L.R.B. 832 (1967); Central N.M. Chapter, Nat'l
Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 152 N.L.R.B. 1604 (1965).
86. Don Burgess Constr. Corp., 227 N.L.R.B. 765 (1977), enforced, 596 F.2d 378
(9th Cir. 1979).
87. 231 N.L.R.B. 76.
88. Id. at 77.
89. Id.
90. By way of illustration, two employers which are completely separate but
operate similar businesses may have employees with a community of interests. They
would not, however, be a single employer. Conversely, a contractor that had two
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establishing this distinction, the Board reviewed substantially the same
facts it had in its previous finding of separate employers, 9 ' and concluded that a single bargaining unit was not appropriate."
On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed." Applying a clearly erof the Board,
roneous standard, the court deferred to the reasoning
9"
NLRB.
the
by
applied
test
and sanctioned the
On their face, these South PrairieH cases finally established that,
in the context of double-breasted operations, the appropriate unit issue
would retain vitality independent of the single employer question. The
situation giving rise to the Board's decision in South Prairie II,
however, prompts the more cautious observer to doubt whether the
impact of this decision would be as substantial as it would first appear.
Because the single employer finding was thrust upon the Board by the
courts, rather than being a voluntary pronouncement, the Board may
have been more concerned with achieving the desired result, and at the
same time preserving its own autonomy, than with establishing the unit
issue as another barrier to unions contesting the validity of doublebreasted operations. Thus, while the South Prairie cases established
the unit inquiry as a second prong to the test for double-breasted
operations, it was questionable whether the NLRB would employ the
same critical analysis on the single unit question once the Board itself
had found a single employer. Moreover, even if the Board did continue to give considerable scrutiny to the unit issue, it was uncertain
whether the Board would commonly find a single employer, yet deny
representation to the union.
III. APPLICATION OF THE SINGLE EMPLOYER DOCTRINE
Since the Supreme Court's decision in South Prairie, the Radio
Union four-criteria test has generally been applied in determining if a
double-breasted operation is to be treated as a single employer. 9"
Gerace, hpwever, has also remained a leading case,"' and the Board's
enterprises, one for electrical contracting and one for plumbing contracting, may be a
single employer, but would probably not have employees constituting an appropriate
single bargaining unit.
91. 206 N.L.R.B. 562.
92. 231 N.L.R.B. at 78.
93. 595 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1979). This conclusion may have resulted in part
from the Supreme Court's admonition that the Board's decisions should rarely be
disturbed. See 425 U.S. at 805.
94. 595 F.2d at 851.
95. See, e.g., United Constructors, 233 N.L.R.B. 904 (1977); Don Burgess Constr.
Corp., 227 N.L.R.B. 765 (1977), enforced, 596 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1979); Carvel Co.,
226 N.L.R.B. 111 (1976).
96. Id.
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pro-employer attitude on the issue continues. What is unclear is the
way in which this test is to be applied, the relative weight to be given
each criterion and the factors which are to be utilized in evaluating
them.97 Moreover, some grounds exist for observing that there are
other, implied criteria, which the Board considers in its
determination. 9
A. A PreliminaryConcern: The Relevant Time For Evaluating
The Issue
Gerace created an implicit question concerning the relevant time
period for evaluating the single employer issue. Because the Board
considered certain critical events which occurred after the filing of the
unfair labor practice charge, 99 it appeared that the Board might allow
closely related entities to avoid a finding of a single employer by
changing their relationship after the filing of the complaint but before
the hearing. Carried to its extreme, this unique rationale would appear
to license contractors who operate two firms to do so without fear of
reproach, as long as they would respond promptly to union charges by
separating the two entities.
Gerace, however, did not expressly discuss this point. Such a position can only be inferred from the Board's evaluation of the facts. Nor
is it clear from the decision whether Gerace Construction and Helger
would have avoided a single employer finding absent consideration of
the facts occurring after the filing of the complaint. 10 It is clear,
however, that the Board will take these facts into account. Likewise,
Gerace suggests that the events surrounding the formation of the
double-breasted operation are of little if any concern," 1" especially if
97. See Bornstein, supra note 1, at 87-88.
98. See notes 177-80 and accompanying text infra.
99. The NLRB made specific reference to facts occurring in November, 1970, and
at "the date of the hearing." 193 N.L.R.B. at 645. The union had initially filed its
complaint with the Board in September, 1970. Id. at 646 (trial examiner's decision).
100. Similarly, the degree that the Board considered events occurring in
September, 1970, after the union had confronted Francis Gerace about Helger is not
clear. See notes 36-38 and accompanying text supra. Arguably, these facts likewise
should not be considered. This would not only permit companies to sever in order to
avoid a single employer finding, but would discourage the union from seeking relief
through informal means.
101. While the trial examiner in Gerace put substantial weight on these factors, 193
N.L.R.B. at 647-50, the Board did not even address them. This approach, too, could
have far reaching implications. Gerace imports that, at its inception, the nonunion
firm could owe its entire existence to, and be totally dependent on, the union company. See also Western Union Corp., 224 N.L.R.B. 274 (1976), aff'd, 571 F.2d 665
(D.C. Cir. 1978). The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Court in South PrairieI, however, put great emphasis on how the nonunion entity
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol6/iss1/5
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the two entities are becoming progressively more independent. , 2
Unfortunately, subsequent decisions have done little to illuminate
this problem. It has not been directly addressed by the Board, the
courts, or commentators. One indication that the NLRB may not in
every instance consider events occurring after confrontation and the
filing of the charge, is a statement in the administrative law judge's
decision, adopted by the Board, in Safety Electric Corporation."3 In
that case, in March 1977, a union representative contacted Gust, the
principle owner of the union concern, and an incorporator and director in a newly created nonunion company, about the nonunion firm
becoming signatory to the collective bargaining agreement.' 0 4 At that
time, a union employee inquired as to why Gust's son, who was purportedly in charge of the nonunion concern, was working on a job for
the union company. Gust, while disclaiming involvement in the nonunion firm, represented that the situation would soon cease. That same
month, Gust resigned from the board of directors of the nonunion
business. One month later, his son ceased work with the union compoccurred prior to the confrontation, none
any. While crew interchange
5
1
subsequently.
place
took
The trial examiner implied that these changes were motivated by
the confrontation by the union. Thus, he did not give weight to the
changes, and proceeded to find the two companies to be single
employers.' 6 The Board summarily adopted the trial examiners findings.
While Safety Electriccannot in any manner be considered a shift in
approach by the Board, it does at least offer some hope that if the
Board is ever forced to directly confront the issue, it will refuse to consider facts created by the employer after being notified of possible
union action.
B. Common Control of Labor Relations
Common control of labor relations policies has been established as
the most important criterion in conducting the single employer
inquiry.' 0 7 It is unclear, however, what emphasis the Board will give to
came to operate in the area. Occasionally the Board has left undisturbed similar considerations by administrative judges. See Safety Elec. Corp., 239 N.L.R.B. 40 (1978).
Thus, such concerns may not be altogether exempt from scrutiny.
102. 193 N.L.R.B. at 645.
103. 239 N.L.R.B. 40. See also Edward J. White, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 1020 (1978).
104. Id. (decision of administrative law judge).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Gerace Constr. Co., 193 N.L.R.B. 645 (1971); 21 NLRB ANN. REP. 14-15
(1956).
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this factor. In both Gerace and its initial South Prairiedecision, the
Board suggested that this factor may be determinative in itself.'*0 The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit's initial decision
in South Prairierejected this approach, holding that no single criterion
should be given controlling weight.'0 9 The Supreme Court's opinion,
although offering little guidance, sanctioned the appellate court's approach.",0
If the Board's Gerace and South Prairie I decisions did indeed
reflect an intent to shift from the broad four-criteria test to a more
narrow labor relations inquiry, it is clear that the movement has since
been abandoned, at least on the face of the Board's latter decisions.'I
It is unlikely, however, that the Board would find a single employer in
the double-breasting context, absent proof of this element. Moreover,
the Board has more recently stated that "common ownership . . . is
not determinative in the absence of common control of labor relations
policies. Furthermore, 'such common control must be actual or active,
distinguished from potential control. Other factors to be considered
are interrelation of operations and common management.' """ If this
language is to be taken literally, proof of common control of labor
relations, together with a showing of common ownership, will be sufficient to warrant a finding of a single employer. The inference may also
be made that, because the other two criteria, interrelationship and
common management, have consistently been viewed as more significant than common ownership,"I 3 a showing of either of these two factors in conjunction with a demonstration of common control of labor
relations would be dispositive. Given the inevitable overlap between
these criteria, probably few instances will arise when a finding of common control of labor relations would not be accompanied by a finding
of one of these other two factors. Thus, from a pragmatic standpoint,
the degree of common control of labor relations would be controlling
in virtually every case, both for and against finding a single
employer. 'I"
108. In a latter decision, the Board interpreted these cases as holding that actual
common control of labor relations must be shown before a single employer could be
found. Appalachian Constr., Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. 685 (1978).
109. 518 F.2d 1040.
110. See notes 73 and 74 supra.
111. See, e.g., Edward J. White, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 1020 (1978).
112. Carvel Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 111 (1976) (citing Gerace Constr., Inc., 193
N.L.R.B. 645 (1971)).
113. See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
114. It is noteworthy that there has not been a single double-breasting case where
the final decision on the single employer issue was not supported by the presence or

absence of common control of labor relations.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol6/iss1/5

19811

COMMENTS

Having ascertained the probable weight which will be given to this
criterion, it becomes necessary to determine how the Board will determine if common control of labor relations exists in a particular case.
The Board has emphasized that such common control must be actual
or active, rather than potential. I I On its face, this would appear to require some affirmative showing by the union of facts demonstrating
the exercise of this control. The mere fact that an individual is in the
position to exercise the power is insufficient." 6
A corollary to this requirement would seem to be that common
control of labor relations cannot be inferred from a paper demonstration of corporate organization, or from the existence of one or more of
the other three criteria. Ironically, the NLRB has sanctioned such a
procedure in at least two non-double-breasting cases."II While such an
approach may have some redeeming value," 8, it is inconsistent with the
Board's delineated test. Unless the Board chooses to change this test,
such deviations should not be countenanced.
Consistently with the requirement that control be active, the NLRB
has primarily focused on "day-to-day operations.""' Trial examiners"' and the courts'' have said that the finding of such day-today control could be grounded on the overall relationship of the entities. The NLRB has not, however, adopted this view.
The Board on occasion, has given at least some scrutiny to upper
management."' Such an inquiry, however, will generally only be employed to defeat the single employer finding. In a non-double115. See, e.g., Gerace Constr., Inc., 193 N.L.R.B. 645 (1971).
116. Id.
117. Tabernacle Sand & Gravel Corp., 232 N.L.R.B. 957 (1977); A.S. Abell Co.,
230 N.L.R.B. 17 (1977).
118. Actual control is an illusive standard to prove, especially when the employer
proceeds cautiously. The inquiry may be more meaningful and realistic if the power to
control is given at least some weight.
119. Gerace Constr., Co., 193 N.L.R.B. 645 (1971).
120. Id. at 650 (trial examiner's decision).
121. See Royal Typewriter Co. v. NLRB, 533 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir. 1976). In Royal,
the court stated:
In assessing the appropriateness of single employer treatment, the fact that dayto-day labor matters are handled at the local level is not controlling. See Darlington Manufacturing Co. v. NLRB, 397 F.2d 760, 765 (4th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1023, 89 S. Ct. 632, 21 L. Ed.2d 567 (1969); Sakrete of Northern
California, Inc. v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 902, 907 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 961, 85 S. Ct. 649, 13 L. Ed.2d 556 (1965). A more critical test is whether the
controlling company possessed the present and apparent means to exercise its
clout in matters of labor negotiations.
Id. at 1043.
122. Numrich Arms Corp., 237 N.L.R.B. 313 (1978). Obviously, in small familyowned operations there may be only one level of management. The very nature of such
operations will tend to make them more susceptible to a single employer finding.
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breasting case, the Board has gone so far as to indicate that separate
vice-presidents of labor relations, each who has no authority in the
other's sphere, will per se defeat any finding of common control of
labor relations. I3 While similar arrangements may also be given weight
in double-breasting cases, the relatively small scale of the contractors'
operations makes an in-depth inquiry more feasible. Thus, the entities
may be subject to a finding that such officers are merely figureheads.""
In light of the above analysis, a more comprehensive enunciation
of this criterion would be whether there is actual, active control of dayto-day labor relations policies. In determining if such control exists,
several factors have been considered in various cases:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

whether both operate on a closed shop basis;
whether both entities are operated with regard to craft lines;
whether pay rates are the same;' 2 '
whether the two entities maintain separate health and workmen's
compensation policies;"'
(5) whether the same individuals conduct high level labor relations
policies;'2

(6) whether each firm has separate job supervisors;2'
(7) whether different individuals hire and control job supervisors;' 2
(8) whether vacations are administered by separate individuals;,30
123. Western Union Corp., 224 N.L.R.B. 274 (1976), aff'd, 571 F.2d 665 (D.C.
Cir. 1978). This decision virtually assures that a larger corporation can immunize itself
from a single employer finding with a little good advice and careful planning. The
Board seems reticent to look behind such paper arrangements. Nonetheless, several
large conglomerates have been subject to a single employer finding. See, e.g., Royal
Typewriter Co. v. NLRB, 533 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir. 1976).
124. See Safety Elec. Corp., 239 N.L.R.B. 40 (1978).
125. Gerace Constr., Co., 193 N.L.R.B. 645 (1971). While these first three factors
are unquestionably of great significance when the single employer inquiry is being
made in order to determine if the Board has jurisdiction, there is no ascertainable
reason why these factors should be of any relevance in a double-breasting case.
Because the formation of the nonunion shop is inspired by a desire to save on labor
costs, it would be rare to find a case where these factors would not operate in favor of
finding separate employers.
126. Id. The failure to separate these policies should be considered as a strong indicium of common labor relations, along with common management and interrelation
of operations. If the enterprises were truly separate, such common plans would not exist. But the existence of such separate policies should be given little weight, in that it
reflects nothing more than a "paper arrangement." NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc.,
361 U.S. 398, 403 (1960). Nonetheless, the Board apparently views such separate
policies as signficant.
127. Frank N. Smith Assoc., Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. 212 (1971) (trial examiner's decision).
128. Id.

129. Id.
130. Id.
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(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)

(14)

whether separate individuals have the authority to enter into, or
refuse to enter into, union agreements;' 3
whether different individuals possess the power to hire and fire;132
whether different individuals control pay scales;' 3
whether the companies maintain different fringe benefit plans; 3 "
whether one company renders services to the other for the administration of labor relations policies, and, if so, whether that
company is compensated for these services;' 33 and
whether the individual who initially established the labor relations
policies of the nonunion entity also played an active role in labor
relations for the union firm.'

While other facts may enter into the analysis, these indicia will play
an important role in determining whether central control of labor relations, and thus a single employer, exists.
C. Interrelation of Operations
Next to common control of labor relations, interrelation of operations is probably the most important criterion of a single employer. 3"
Several reasons can be given to support giving such great weight to this
criterion. First, this element, more than any other, is central to the
essence of the single employer inquiry. It virtually restates the theory
behind the doctrine; when two entities are sufficiently integrated they
will be considered as one for the purposes of the Act."3 8 Second, and
perhaps more significantly, the question of interrelatedness turns on
more ascertainable facts than the more intangible questions of control.
131. Carpenters Local Union No. 213, 201 N.L.R.B. 23 (1973). Safety Elec. Corp.,
239 N.L.R.B. 40 (1978).
132. Carpenters Local Union No. 213, 201 N.L.R.B. 23 (1973). Once again, it
would not be difficult for the parties to disguise such control by using an intermediary,
with no actual authority, to inform employees of hiring and firing. In such a case, the
disguise may be pierced by evidence of "the management" deferring decisions until it
has a chance to consult the owner, or by evidence that the owner screens or interviews
job applicants. See, e.g., Safety Elec. Corp., 239 N.L.R.B. 40 (1978).
133. Carpenters Local Union No. 213, 201 N.L.R.B. 23 (1973). It is interesting to
note that in this case the trial examiner found the president of the nonunion enterprise
to be autonomous, although recognizing that the individual owning both firms probably had the authority to discharge him. While this point is consistent with the requirement that control be actual rather than potential, it is doubtful if any manager
can be considered totally autonomous when he can be fired at will.
134. Western Union Corp., 224 N.L.R.B. 274 (1976), aff'd, 511 F.2d 665 (D.C.
Cir. 1978). See note 125 supra.
135. Id.
136. See Edward J. White, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 1020 (1978).
137. See Mattiace Petrochemical Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 15 (1978).
138. 21 NLRB ANN. REP. 14-15 (1956); See also Comment, Dual Companies,
supra note 3.
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Thus, the union will be better able to demonstrate interrelation of
operations.
Factors which have been considered in determining if a single
employer exists, which have relevance to this criterion, include:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)

(11)

whether the enterprises are separate legal entities;139
whether separate bank and payroll accounts are maintained;" '
whether the entities share a common bookkeeper;"'
4
whether separate corporate records are kept;'
whether separate state and federal tax returns are filed;"13
whether the firms submit separate job bids;'"
whether such firms operate on their own capital;"
whether one firm gives performance guarantees for the other;' 4
17
whether there is any interchange of employees;
whether one company uses land, facilities, and equipment of the
other, and whether rent or other consideration is paid for such
privilege; 141
whether the entities share a common office, and, if so, what compensation is paid to the owner of the building; '

139. Gerace Constr., Co., 193 N.L.R.B. 645 (1971). The South Prairie cases,
however, suggest that a subsidiary relationship will not necessarily defeat separate
employer status. See also Western Union Corp., 224 N.L.R.B. 274 (1976), aff'd, 511
F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1978). It is less clear whether separate divisions of the same corporation are entitled to separate employer status. Royal Typewriter Co. v. NLRB, 533
F.2d 1030 (8th Cir. 1976), may indicate that they are so entitled.
140. Gerace Constr., Co., 193 N.L.R.B. 645 (1971). As in insurance and fringe
benefit plans, the separation of such accounts should probably be entitled to relatively
little weight. While on paper the entities may appear separate, the actual degree of interrelation cannot be determined by such superficial inquiries. See note 125 supra.
141. Id. This factor, however, is relatively unimportant as long as separate books
are kept. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. More than any other factor, this one may be determinative of the question
of interrelatedness. Indeed, in a jurisdictional determination, one administrative law
judge found a single employer substantially on the weight of this factor alone. Mattiace Petrochemical Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 15 (1978). This finding is not necessarily inconsistent with the four-criteria test, in that substantial employee interchange also carries
broad implications of common control of management and labor relations.
Nonetheless, isolated employee interchanges have been countenanced. See Frank N.
Smith Assoc., Inc., 193 N.L.R.B. 644, 645 (1971). Gerace also suggests that the
transfer of employees at the inception of the new entity is permissible. Such transfers
may be scrutinized more closely if employees transferring are permitted to retain their
seniority. See Riverside Memorial Chapels, Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. 2 (1976). Furthermore,
a substantial transfer of bargaining unit employees may lead to an alter ego finding.
See note 10 supra. See generally Comment, Dual Companies, supra note 3, at 94-95.
148. Gerace Constr., Co., 193 N.L.R.B. 645 (1971).
149. Frank N. Smith Assoc., Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. 212 (1971).
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(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
(22)
(23)

whether the same individual does job estimating for both enterprises;I1°
whether the companies have the same accountant, and, if so, if he
is paid by each separately;'
whether the entities shared the same telephone number and directory listing; 2'
whether the companies advertise jointly;
whether the enterprises refer clients to one another;'"
whether the firms conduct separate directors meetings;'"
whether the firms ever engage in common work projects;" 6
whether the owners of the firms distribute work among them; S
whether the firms deal with the same clients;
whether one firm subcontracts work to the other;' 59
whether the entities have separate contractor's licenses;' 0 and 6
whether the entities have different tax identification numbers.' '

The weight that each of these factors will be given is unclear. With
the possible exception of employee interchange,' 6 2 none will be controlling. All appear to be valid considerations. Because of the
necessarily ad hoc nature of the Board's inquiry, it would be impossible to give a magic number of these elements which would conclusively
establish interrelationship. Gerace and Smith, however, clearly import
that the union must demonstrate that a substantial number of these
factors support an interrelationship finding.
D. Common Management
The third criterion, and the most encompassing, is common management. In determining whether common management exists, virtually
3
all of the indicia of common control of labor relations' and interrela150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Local No. 627, Int'l Union of Operating Engineers v. NLRB, 518 F.2d 1040
(D.C. Cir. 1975), aff'd. in part, rev'd in part, sub nom. South Prairie Constr., Co. v.
Local No. 627, Int'l Union of Operating Engineers, 425 U.S. 800 (1976). See note 61
supra. Subcontracting, however, is not dispositive. United Constructors, 233 N.L.R.B.
904 (1977). But see, Don Burgess Constr. Corp., 227 N.L.R.B. 765 (1977), enforced,
596 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1979).
160. Safety Elec. Corp., 239 N.L.R.B. 40 (1978).
161. Id.
162. See note 147 supra.
163. See notes 125-36 and accompanying text supra.
Published by eCommons, 1981

UNIVERSITY OF DA YTON LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 6:1

tion of operations' 6 are relevant. In addition, the following factors are
of particular importance to this inquiry:
(1) whether there are common directors; '
(2) whether there are common officers; 166
(3) whether the owners participate in the day-to-day management of
both entities; 67
(4) if there are separate management officials, whether they are relatively autonomous;"6 and
(5) whether the management of the new firm is largely comprised of
the old firm's former management personnel." '
Like the inquiry into common control of labor relations, the common
management issue turns on actual, active control.' 70 Generally, the
focus is on day-to-day management decisions."
E. Common Ownership
The most easily determined criterion, and the least important one, 72
is common ownership. It is sufficient for the purposes of this inquiry
that such common ownership is only partial,' 7 3 although it is questionable whether a relatively small percentage of ownership would be
sufficient to establish this criterion. Common ownership may be found
when ownership is vested in one family, rather than an individual.''
Just as the existence of common ownership does not establish the
existence of a single employer, the existence of common ownership is
not necessary to such a finding. 75 If it appears that ownership has
been divested to specifically avoid unfair labor practice charges, a
single employer may nonetheless be found. 17 6 But in the absence of
common ownership or a sham transaction, there may be little possibility that a single employer will be held to exist.
164. See notes 139-61 and accompanying text supra.
165. Gerace Constr., Co., 193 N.L.R.B. 645 (1971).
166. Frank N. Smith Assoc., Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. 212 (1971).
167. Carpenters Local Union No. 213, 201 N.L.R.B. 23 (1973).
168. Id.
169. Local No. 627, Int'l Union of Operating Engineers v. NLRB, 518 F.2d 1040
(D.C. Cir. 1975), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, sub nom. South Prairie Constr. Co. v.
Local No. 627, Int'l Union of Operating Engineers, 425 U.S. 800 (1976). See note 61
supra.
170. Gerace Constr., Co., 193 N.L.R.B. 645 (1971).
171. Carpenters Local Union No. 213, 201 N.L.R.B. 23 (1973).
172. Frank N. Smith Assoc., Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. 212 (1971).
173. Edward J. White, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 1020 (1978).
174. Safety Elec. Corp., 239 N.L.R.B. 40 (1978).
175. Holland Rantos Co., 234 N.L.R.B. 726, 728 (1978) (administrative law judge's
decision).
176. Safety Elec. Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 40 (1978).
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F. A Fifth Criterion?
In addition to the four criteria which the Board has expressly
recognized as determinative of the single employer finding, there are
other factors which have been given some weight. These factors appear
to bear no substantial relationship to the four stated criteria, and thus
must be viewed as having some independent significance.
Foremost among these unstated criteria is the degree which the
nonunion entity was intended to, and actually has, deprived the union
company and union employees of work."' Other factors which are frequently considered, such as whether the entities compete,'
and
whether the nonunion firm is of comparable size to the union company, appear to relate primarily to this inquiry.' 79
Consideration of this fifth criteria is justifiable. The essence of the
union charge, under the statutory scheme, is that the employer has
refused to bargain in relation to the employees of the new entity. If the
employer is motivated by some union animus, this attitude warrants
consideration. Likewise, if the establishment of the nonunion shop is
depriving union employees of jobs, it would arguably contravene the
Act's remedial purpose to deny consideration of this fact. 80
G. Alternative Standards
In South Prairie ,8 the Court of Appeals for the District of Col-

umbia Circuit suggested two alternative standards by which the single
employer question could be evaluated. First, the court suggested that
whether a single employer exists should be determined from all of the
circumstances in a particular case.'
This "totality of the circumstances" approach would have some advantages. In an area where
inquiries are necessarily ad hoc, it would free the Board of the more
rigid four-criteria test. In certain instances, the Board has appeared to
177. See note 48 and accompanying text supra.
178. One commentator has expressed doubt as to whether this factor should have
any relevance whatsoever. Bornstein, supra note 1, at 82. Bornstein suggests that the
two entities should be permitted to freely compete with one another. While Bornstein
may go too far, at a minimum the Board should not place a great deal of weight on
this factor. At best, it is a poor indicium of the danger of losing union jobs. Even conceding that preserving union jobs is a valid policy concern, competition does not per se
interfere with this policy. Only when competition has a detrimental effect is it of any
relevance. Moreover, as recognized by the trial examiner in Gerace, if the entities were
truly separate, there is no doubt that they would feel free to compete.
179. See note 48 and accompanying text supra.
180. 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1976).
181. See note 61 supra.
182. 518 F.2d at 1045.
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adapt its test to the facts, so as to reach the desired result.' 83 Thus, the
adoption of this totality approach may be a more candid means of approaching the problem. A "totality of the circumstances" test would,
however, tend to create even less ascertainable guidelines than the
vague four-criteria approach. The current approach offers at least
some guidance to the construction industry, albeit very little.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in South
PrairieI also suggested that the basic single employer inquiry should
be aimed at determining if the entities are operating at arms length. 8 ,
If using this inquiry as the focal point for the single employer test has
any advantages, they are difficult to ascertain. Indeed, it appears that
an enterprise may be operated at arms length despite common ownership, common management, and common control of labor relations.
Thus, the arms length test not only shares the inherent vagueness of the
four-criteria test, it also fails to give sufficient emphasis to factors
which traditionally have been, and should be evaluated in determining
if two entities sh.ould be treated as one.
IV. THE APPROPRIATE UNIT FOR BARGAINING

The South Prairiecases ' established that a single employer finding would not in itself mandate inclusion in the same bargaining
unit.' 86 Additionally, the Board must find that the employees of both
concerns have the community interests necessary to warrant a single
unit finding.' 8 Because the unit comprised of only the union enterprises's employees will be presumptively valid,' 88 the union, in order to
establish the larger unit as the only appropriate one, must demonstrate
that the two entities have "been so effectively merged into a more
comprehensive unit by bargaining history, or [are] so integrated ...

as

to negate [their] identity."' 89 If the union cannot meet this burden, but
can demonstrate that the larger unit is also appropriate, the union will
be relegated to persuading the NLRB that policy considerations sup-

183. See Edward J. White, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 1020 (1978).
184. 518 F.2d 1046. This approach has some foundation in Board authority. See
Overton Mkts., Inc., 142 N.L.R.B. 615 (1963).
185. See note 61 supra.
186. 425 U.S. 800, 805.
187. 231 N.L.R.B. 76. See also Central N.M. Chapter, Nat'l Elec. Contractors
Ass'n, 152 N.L.R.B. 1604 (1965).
188. See Dixie Belle Mills, Inc., 139 N.L.R.B. 629 (1962). This presumption applies because a singleplant unit is one of the types of units listed in section 9(b) as appropriate. Id. While the construction firm may not actually be a plant, the same rationale applies. 231 N.L.R.B. at 77 n.7.
189. 139 N.L.R.B. at 631.
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port finding a single bargaining unit. 19 Section 9(b) of the Act gives
the Board broad descretion in making this determination.
In determining whether a single bargaining unit is appropriate, the
Board takes cognizance of many factors.
[T]he following factors are particularly relevant: the bargaining history;
the functional integration of operations; the differences in the types of
work and the skills of the employees; the extent of centralization of
management and supervision, particularly in regard to labor relations,
hiring, discipline, and control of day-to-day operations; and the extent of
interchange and contact between the groups of employees.1 91
On its face, the bargaining unit inquiry is strikingly similar to the
single employer test. Many of the same factors are considered for both
analysis. 92 The purposes of the two inquiries, however, are distinct.
While the single employer test focuses on the employer, the unit question places principal emphasis on the employees."'
This distinction may be more theoretical than real. While generally
the inquiries are nominally kept separate, as a practical matter a single
employer finding has almost always led to a single unit
determination.' 9 ' Unless it is confronted with a situation similar to
South Prairie,the Board is likely to establish a single bargaining unit if
a single employer is found, absent some definitive facts showing a
readily ascertainable lack of a community of interests.'"
190. 231 N.L.R.B. at 77. The statute provides that the Board should make its unit
determination by considering which unit "will assure to employees the fullest freedom
in exercising the rights guaranteed" by the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976).
191. 231 N.L.R.B. at 77.
192. See notes 125-76 and accompanying text supra.
193. 231 N.L.R.B. at 77.
194. See, e.g., Safety Elec. Corp., 239 N.L.R.B. 40 (1978); Edward J. White, Inc.,
237 N.L.R.B. 1020 (1978); Ellsworth Sheet Metal, Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. 1273 (1978), enforced, 603 F.2d 214 (2nd Cir. 1979); Don Burgess Constr. Corp., 227 N.L.R.B. 765
(1977), enforced, 596 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1979). Central N.M. Chapter, Nat'l Elec.
Contractors Ass'n, 152 N.L.R.B. 1604 (1965), and other pre-1971 decisions contrary to
this trend do not necessarily negate this theory. The single employer doctrine has
undergone substantial evolution since these decisions, therefore, it is unlikely that the
facts of those cases would warrant a single employer finding today. The Board's proemployer attitude on the single employer issue has directly lessened the significance of
the unit inquiry. Once a union passes the rigorous single employer test, it has, in all
likelihood, already established many of the factors which it must show for the unit inquiry. See, e.g., Don Burgess Constr. Corp., 227 N.L.R.B. 765 (1977), enforced, 596
F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1979). This establishment was not as likely to be true in the pre-1971
cases. Similarly, the Board's South Prairie II decision is distinguishable because of the
context giving rise to it. See notes 65-75 and accompanying text supra. These decisions,
however, can not be treated as aberrations. While they represent the exception rather
than the rule, the Board undoubtedly will utilize these cases when it deems it necessary.
195. This approach would seem preferable to placing the onus on the union. In
most cases, the union, by establishing the existence of a single employer, has also
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Moreover, in spite of the Supreme Court's ruling in South Prairie
that,"a single employer does not necessarily establish that an employerwide unit is appropriate,"' 9 6 the Board has suggested that, in some
instances, a single employer finding will be sufficient in and of itself to
bind the nonunion entity to the collective bargaining agreement of the
union enterprise. In Don Burgess Construction Corporation,'97 the administrative law judge, after finding that the two entities involved constituted a single employer,' stated:
Inasmuch as the two Respondents constitute a single employer and under
the circumstances of this case, a union contract executed by one Respondent is ipso facto binding on the other. It thus becomes unnecessary to
consider whether the carpentry employees of the two integrated Respondents constitute a single appropriate unit.' 9
The administrative law judge failed to specify what circumstances
mandated this conclusion. The judge's citation to the South Prairie
cases2"' may indicate that the rationale was based on the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit's South PrairieI reversal of
the Board's decision."' Apparently, the judge was not aware of the
Supreme Court's decision requiring the independent unit finding.2 02
Ironically, the NLRB in Burgess was thus confronted with a similar
situation to that faced by the Supreme Court several months earlier in
shown sufficient facts to give prima facie support to a single unit finding. Shitting the
burden to the employer at this point is not unconscionable. First, the employer has
already enjoyed a sizeable advantage on the single employer inquiry. Second, although
the employer is technically being asked to prove a negative, there is no real proof problem. The indicia of a single unit (see note 191 and accompanying text supra) appear
tangible enough that the employer could show their absence as easily as the union can
show their presence. Moreover, the Board will have already made findings relating to
the more intangible indicia when it made its single employer finding. Thus, the actual
burden on the employer would be relatively insignificant. But the net effect of making
the employer prove a lack of community of interests would be to virtually create a
presumption in favor of the larger unit. If the employer could not rebut this presumption, then the Board would recognize the union as representatives of employees of both
enterprises. Thus, the single employer finding Would dictate a single unit unless the
single unit was inappropriate. Contra, Dixie Belle Mills, Inc., 139 N.L.R.B. 629
(1962).
196. 425 U.S. at 805.
197. 227 N.L.R.B. 765 (1977), enforced, 596 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1979).
198. 227 N.L.R.B. at 773 (administrative law judge's decision).
199. Id. at 774.
200. See note 61 supra.
201. 518 F.2d 1040.
202. Interestingly, the administrative law judge's decision in Burgess was made approximately two months after the Supreme Court handed down South Prairie.But, the
administrative law judge's decision contained no indication that he was aware of the
Court's South Prairiedecision. See 227 N.L.R.B. at 773-74 (administrative law judge's
decision). Thus, possibly this intermediate decision was based in part on the United
States Court of Appeal for the D.C. Circuit's erroneous South Prairieholding.
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South Prairie. The Board, however, rather than correcting the rationale of the administrative law judge, gave some credence to his position. The Board stated:
The Administrative Law Judge concluded that since the two Respondents
were a single employer the carpentry employees of both Respondents
together constitute a single unit for collective-bargaining purposes. We
agree that the carpentry employees of [the two entities] constitute an
apropriate unit. We rely both on the reasons set forth by the Administrative Law Judge and on the fact that all of the employees possess
the same skills, perform the same functions share the same general working conditions, and usually work at the same duties. 30
The Board's statement that it was relying both on the administrative law judge's reasoning and on the existence of certain other
facts, gives some credence to the view that "since the two Respondents
were a single employer . . .both Respondents together constitute a
single unit for collective-bargaining purposes." 20 Thus, the Board not
only failed to explicitly correct the rationale of the administrative law
judge, but also arguably endorsed his logic. 5
The NLRB's decision in Burgess creates serious doubt concerning
the degree to which the Board will separately scrutinize the single
employer and single bargaining unit issues. While the Board in South
Prairie II necessarily emphasized the distinction in order to justify not
finding a single bargaining unit where a single employer had already
been found, Burgess suggested that scrutiny would be less rigorous
when the single employer finding was not imposed on the Board by the
courts. Indeed, Burgess can be read to indicate that, in some instances,
a single employer finding will in and of itself mandate inclusion in the
same bargaining unit.
When the Board's overall treatment of the unit issue is
considered,"' it becomes clear that the single unit question, as a prac203.

227 N.L.R.B. at 765.

204. Id.

205. Discerning how the facts in Burgess justify such an exception is difficult. Only
two conceivable grounds exist. First, it could be argued that the exception is warranted

because the collective bargaining agreement was executed after the nonunion company
was formed. This view is the interpretation the D.C. Circuit gave to Burgess in its

South Prairie II decision. Id. at 850 n. 17. If the unit inquiry is truly distinct, no ascertainable difference exists. To suggest that two units cannot operate under one
employer is absurd. Such an arrangement is common, especially in the construction in-

dustry.

The only other possible reason for justifying an exception on the facts of Burgess is
the finding of deceitful employer practices. 227 N.L.R.B. at 771-72. While this finding
may be a more viable ground, it is difficult to see why it would totally obviate any need

for a unit determination.

206. See notes 194-205 and accompanying text supra.
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tical matter, is a subordinate inquiry in a challenge to a doublebreasted operation. ' " If separate employers are found, inquiry into the
appropriate unit will be unnecessary. 20° If a single employer is found,
the Board is likely to find a single bargaining unit to be appropriate.
V. CONCLUSION

The law of double-breasted operations is still in its adolescent stage
of development. Many questions remain unanswered.
The Radio Union test for a single employer has been expanded into
the double-breasting context, and is now generally accepted as controlling. An enumeration of these four criteria alone, however, offers
little guidance. The Board should expound on the test, explaining how
much weight should be given to each criterion and what facts are relevant in the evaluation. Furthermore, a blind transfer of the Radio
Union jurisdictional test onto this totally different concept is inadequate. The Board must shape the test to the context in which it is being
applied. Certain factors, such as those relating to bargaining history
and employee benefits, should be given little if any consideration when
the single employer inquiry relates to a double-breasted operation.
Conversely, other factors may warrant greater consideration. Indeed,
the Board may be justified in establishing a fifth criteria, such as the
nonunion company's deprivation of union work, in double-breasting
cases. The Board, however, must exercise a greater degree of candor in
developing the test. A necessary corollary to this analysis is that is
should be slow to summarily accept administrative law judges' decisions, and quick to correct them. To allow a decision based on faulty
rationale to stand merely because it reaches the correct result severely
frustrates any development of a cohesive body of law on the subject.
The need for candor is even more essential in making the appropriate unit inquiry. Labor Board decisions clearly import that this
is subordinate to the more fundamental single employer inquiry. The
Board should expressly recognize this fact. Of course, this does not
mean that the bargaining unit inquiry should not be made. It should,
however, be a more limited inquiry focusing only on whether the larger
unit sought by the union is appropriate.
The development of the law of double-breasting has been piecemeal. As a result, the law is largely unascertainable. Guidance from
the Board is long overdue.
Stephen A. Watring
207. Edward C. Kelly Co., 230 N.L.R.B. 337 (1977).
208. South Prairie Constr. Co. v. Local No.627, Int'l Union of Operating
Engineers, 425 U.S. 800 (1976). But see Frank N. Smith Assoc., Inc., 194 N.L.R.B.
212 (1971). See generally Appalachian Constr., Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. 685 (1978).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol6/iss1/5

